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Abstract
From frequent flyer awards to salesforce perquisites, from peer-to-peer awards to university systems
in formerly Communist countries, gainsharing is common. By gainsharing we mean a side payment
from an upstream agent (an airline) to a downstream agent (a frequent flyer) in return for a higher
evaluation (the flyer chooses the airline and the firm pays the airline because the flyer chose it). In
particular, we analyze side payments in situations where the evaluation-for-side-payment contract is
public knowledge and, implicitly, enforceable. We argue that, for continuous upstream and
downstream reward systems, (1) gainsharing will almost always occur and (2) the firm can design
reward systems to factor out the gainsharing without any loss of profits. Our analyses highlight the
conditions that favor gainsharing and illustrate how and when the firm can take gainsharing into
account.
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There are two things that can be said about bribery. (1) Most of the world does it and (2)
most of the world thinks it's bad. The former is prima facia evidence that individual actors find side
payments to be efficient. The latter expresses the belief that, somehow, side payments hurt the firm.
This paper does not address bribery in all its instances nor do we address the very real moral
issues that surround the topic, but we attempt to provide insight into a limited form of side payments
that are quite relevant to marketing.' We limit our focus to side payments that the firm (or principal)
can anticipate and to situations that can be modeled as a vertical chain. For these situations we
examine conditions under which the structure of the reward system encourages side payments and
conditions under which such side payments do not reduce the profits of the firm.
We begin with a series of examples in which a downstream (D) agent evaluates an upstream
(U) agent, perhaps implicitly, and the firm pays the upstream agent based on that evaluation. In each
case there is some (implicit) cost to the downstream agent for providing a higher evaluation. We then
formalize the problem and demonstrate two results.
Examples
Frequent Flyer Awards
Airlines (U) compete to serve frequent flyers (D) by giving them awards based on the number
of miles that the frequent flyers fly with the airline. The flyer "evaluates" the airline by choosing
that airline over competitive alternatives for the same route. The firm pays the airline based on the
flyer's choice. However, the airline, not the firm, rewards the flyer directly for his or her choice
of airline.
In a recent exchange IBM tried to recapture the benefit of frequent flyer miles by negotiating
directly with American Airlines and United Airlines for "discounts on business travel in exchange
for eliminating frequent flyer mileage credits to IBM employees, the answer was no." (Boston
Globe, March 13, 1994). The Globe went on to talk about how frequent flyer miles build a
relationship between the airline and the employee rather than the airline and the firm and speculated
that IBM would not gain enough additional dollars to offset the value of the lost employee moral.
The Globe even speculated that frequent flyer miles enhance American productivity.
lour interest in this topic is scientific. We wish to understand the phenomenon. Nothing in this paper should be
interpreted as advocating the schemes we describe.
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Frequent flyer programs are public knowledge. It is reasonable to expect that IBM and other
firms can anticipate the rewards that their employees receive and take those rewards into account
when setting employee salaries. It might even be easier for American Airlines and United Airlines
to administer those rewards than it would be for IBM.
Sales Perquisites
Most professional sports arenas have skyboxes and most skyboxes are leased to corporate
sponsors. We are familiar with many organizations that encourage their salespeople to use the
skyboxes to entertain customer representatives. The customer representatives are, in turn, making
buying decisions for their firms. Here the customer representative (D) "evaluates" the salesperson
(U) by placing a buy order for the selling firm's goods or services. The selling firm pays the
salesperson a commission for that order. The invitation to the skybox can be interpreted as a
payment from the salesperson to the customer representative. Certainly the customer representative
benefits directly. From the salesperson's perspective the skybox is a limited resource that is
allocated to the customer representative rather than to the salesperson's friends and family. (The
latter is not unheard of in the business.) In other situations, the salesperson pays for the perquisite
directly (lunch, coffee, gifts under $25).
Most industries have "norms" under which salespeople operate. For example, "professional
sports tickets are okay, but cash payments are not." These rules are often codified in corporate
policies and/or federal tax codes. In such industries it is reasonable to expect that the selling firm
can anticipate the salesperson's side payments and reimburse him or her for those side payments --
sometimes directly with an expense report. Similarly, the buying firm can anticipate the side
payments to the customer representative and take them into account in setting the overall
compensation to the buying representative.
Gifts giving is a related example. For example, Murphy (1995) publishes holiday gift-giving
guidelines. Qualitative discussions with Japanese students suggest that, not only is gift-giving an
accepted business practice, but there are strong cultural guidelines for the value and type of gifts,
and for which business situations require gifts. It is reasonable to assume that Japanese firms can
anticipate the costs and benefits to employees of gift exchanges.
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Internal Customer Satisfaction Systems
Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry (1990) advocate internal customer systems in which the
internal customer (D) rates its internal supplier (U) on a customer-satisfaction score. For example,
the sales organization may be asked to evaluate the sales-support materials provided by the marketing
department. In many of these situations the internal supplier is rewarded by the firm when it receives
higher evaluations from the internal customer. Rewards can include pride, promotions, or even
monetary incentives. For example, both Chester (1995) and Shapria and Globerson (1983) describe
systems in which rewards are continuous functions of the score the internal supplier receives.2
We have heard informally that internal suppliers often reward internal customers for higher
ratings. Such rewards take the form of extra-normal service that increases the well-being of the
internal customer rather than directly increasing the satisfaction of the external customer. Such extra-
normal service is not hidden from the firm and, in principle, the firm can anticipate this extra-normal
service in setting the compensation for both the internal customer and the internal suppliers.
Customer Satisfaction Incentives for Auto Dealers
One major US auto firm pays a bonus of $25 to an auto salesperson (U) whenever the
customer (D) rates that salesperson highly on customer satisfaction. The firm's consultants are aware
that some of the $25 makes its way to customers in the form of gifts (candy, flowers, etc.). The
firm's goal is to satisfy customers. It recognizes that, initially, it might have to pay customers for
that satisfaction. It hopes that, in the long-run, the salesforce will find more efficient ways to serve
customers that "cost" the salesperson less and satisfy the customer more than gifts.
Quality Movement
Many authors in the quality movement advocate that gains be shared among employees
(Bullock and Tubbs 1990, Chester 1995, Cotada 1993, Kuczmarski 1992). Sometimes this is explicit
in the form of "peer-to-peer" awards; other times it is implicit.
2GM Hughes, a $1.4 billion firm with $700 million in R&D spending, uses a gainsharing system, called "results
sharing," in which business units evaluate R&D and in which R&D's salary is based on a piecewise linear function of
that evaluation (Chester 1995).
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In some situations, a downstream producer is asked to rate an upstream supplier. For
example, Starcher (1992) gives an example that was not effective. "Subassembly" (U) was given an
aggressive goal to reduce the number of defects found on inspection. This goal was achieved when
"inspection" (D) found fewer faults and passed on more defects to the final assembly area (requiring
more rework). Presumably, "inspection" gained implicit benefits from helping their friends and
colleagues and, presumably, these benefits outweighed any costs due to raising "inspection's"
evaluation of "subassembly's" work. Although Starcher's example was not efficient for the firm, we
might imagine other situations in which the firm holds "inspection" more accountable for the rework.
With the right incentives "inspection," with its detailed knowledge of the "subassembly" employees,
might make decisions that maximize the firm's profitability.
In another failed experiment a computer firm decided to pay its quality assurance people (D)
$20 for every bug they could find and programmers (U) $20 for every bug they fixed. Almost
immediately an economy in "bugs" developed with employees making as much as $1700 per week
before the firm put an end to the program (Adams 1995). While these examples were counter-
productive for the firm, they do illustrate that gainsharing will occur and that it will affect employee
actions. They do not rule out the possibility that a better designed reward system could take
gainsharing into account.
Universities in Formerly Communist Countries
Sidrys and Jakstait& (1994) describe a situation at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas
Technical University, and Vilnius University where a higher grade translates directly into a higher
monthly stipend from the university. In turn, "some doctoral students of computer science were more
or less required to help build their professor's summer cottage." "There is a widespread practice of
parents bribing instructors to alter exam grades." The authors report that this practice was much
more common for local (Lithuanian) professors than it was for foreign (mostly American) professors
who were not versed in the local culture. Interestingly, while local and foreign instructors varied on
many measures, the smallest variation was on the outcome measure, "how much the students felt they
had learned from their instructors."
In this situation grades have ceased be a clear signal of hard work (although better students
might have to pay less). However, grades might serve another purpose. One interpretation is that,
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to obtain a stipend, students can pay for grades from any professor. However, professors that
otherwise provide higher value can obtain higher payments from the students. Thus, a market has
arisen in which the students appear to be paying local professors for grades but are actually paying
based on grades and the quality of instruction. (Foreign professors are driven by dedication to
helping their ancestors' homeland.) Here the university pays the students (U) for receiving a higher
"evaluation" and the students provide a side payment to their evaluators (D). Because the university
pays local professors only $100 per month, it is not unreasonable to assume that the university
administrators are aware of the local culture.
Lithuanian expatriots report that the system seems to work when there is good reason to
believe that the local instructor will be able to honor the "contract." The system breaks down when
the instructors leave the university unexpectedly and the students (or their families) have no recourse.
Formalization
The above examples illustrate that it is a common situation in marketing for a downstream
agent (D) to evaluate an upstream agent (U) and for the upstream agent to be compensated by the firm
for higher evaluations. It is also common for the upstream agent to provide a side payment to the
downstream agent in exchange for a higher evaluation. We adopt the quality movement's term and
call this side payment a "gainshare." We apply this term to the situation we analyze in this paper and
thus distinguish our analysis from more general cases of bribery.
We assume two properties that we feel model the essence of the above examples: (1) the
evaluation-for-side-payment contract is credible and (2) the firm can anticipate this contract. For
example, we assume that when a traveler chooses an airline the traveler expects that the airline will
honor its commitment to provide frequent flyer mileage credit and we assume that the firm can
anticipate the credit that the traveler will obtain. Similarly, we assume that Lithuanian Ph.D. students
can credibly anticipate an improved grade in return for their labor on the professor's summer cottage
and we assume that the student-built summer cottage can be anticipated by the university. We are
assuming that it is easier to contract on the side payment than it is to contract on the other actions that
the upstream agent chooses. That is, we assume the traveler and the airline can contract on frequent
flyer credit more easily than they can contract on arrival time or in-flight amenities. We assume that
the student and the professor can contract (at least implicitly) on grades for summer-cottage labor
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more easily than they can contract on the value of the knowledge that the professor imparts in his or
her academic discipline. This issue of observability is often discussed in the press. For example,
in commenting upon one hundred deals worth $45 billion in which overseas rivals used bribes to
undercut US firms, the vice-president of the Emergency Committee for American Trade stated that
one solution is to hold the contracting process up to greater public scrutiny (Borrus 1995).
These assumptions limit our focus to certain types of gainsharing. However, we believe that
these types of gainsharing include important marketing issues. We now formalize the above examples
recognizing that-the formalization is an abstraction that may require some elaboration for specific
examples.3 Table 1 interprets the above examples in light of the definitions below.
Notation
We assume that the principal wants to maximize some objective. For some organizations this
could be social welfare (universities) or some surrogate for profit (customer satisfaction). The
objective, ar, is a function of the actions that the agents put forth. That is, the upstream agent (U)
puts forth some action, u, and the downstream agent (D) puts forth some action, d. For example,
if American Airlines provides faster service (u) the frequent flyer might be able to take actions (d)
to serve his or her firm's customers more profitably. We assume that the downstream agent can
observe (and evaluate) the upstream agent's actions much better than firm can observe those actions.
(The frequent flyer experiences the airlines directly.) Formally, we assume that the firm can not
observe u and d directly, but we assume that D can observe u.
We assume that r(u,d) is thrice differentiable and concave in both arguments. We further
allow noise in the firm's ability to reward based on its objective. Call this measure r and model the
noise as a zero-mean, normal random variable, e, such that i = r(u,d)+e.
We assume that the actions are perceived by the agents to be costly. For example, it costs
American Airlines more to provide faster service and it is more onerous for the salesperson to serve
his or her customer better. The costs for the upstream agent are c,(u) and the costs for the
downstream agent are cd(d). We assume that these cost functions are thrice differentiable, increasing,
3We adopt here the formalization that Hauser, Simester and Wernerfelt (1996) use to analyze internal customers
and internal suppliers. We repeat the notation and definitions here so that this article is self-contained.
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and convex. We define these costs as incremental and normalize them to zero. That is, c(O) = 0
and cd(O) = 0. Similarly, we treat X as incremental and normalize 7r(u=O,d) = 0 and r(u,d=O) =0.
Evaluation System
We assume that, either explicitly or implicitly, the downstream customer evaluates the
upstream customer with a rating, s. For example, s can be an explicit internal customer rating or an
implicit rating that the firm infers from a decision made by D. (If IBM pays American Airlines for
the amount of travel that D chooses then D's travel portfolio can be regarded as s.) We restrict our
attention to continuous reward systems where the firm pays the upstream agent v(s) and the
downstream agent w(s,i). That is, we allow D's reward to depend upon the outcome measure that
the firm observes. The frequent flyer's rewards might depend upon his or her contribution to the
firm's profits or the Lithuanian professor's rewards might depend upon his or her contribution to the
social welfare provided by the university.
We examine systems where (1) the firm rewards the upstream customer more if it receives
a higher evaluation and (2) the downstream agent may find it costly to provide that higher evaluation.
We allow linear functions. For example, the frequent flyer might be penalized for excess travel or
the professor might be criticized by peers for giving all "A+'s." Technically, this means we restrict
attention to v and w that are thrice differentiable and concave in s and to v that is increasing in s.
We want s to be an indicator of u's effect on r, thus we examine w's such that 0w2/8uOs > 0.4
The Formal Game
We formalize the order of actions as follows: (1) The firm acts first and announces a reward
system, v and w. Based on this reward system, (2) the upstream agent acts next to select its actions,
u, if by doing so it can do better than not acting. (3) The downstream agent observes these actions,
but the firm does not. (4) Next, U and D agree on a contract for a gainshare, g, and an evaluation,
s. Both do so anticipating what this will imply for D's actions, d, and the resulting expected profit,
4We also make a technical assumption that a2wv/auas is bounded away from zero. This weak assumption simplifies
the formal proof. Without it we need a more complicated and less intuitive proof.
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-r. If they can not agree on a contract, D takes no actions. (5) D announces the evaluation, s. (6)
The upstream agent receives its reward, v(s), based on this evaluation. (7) The downstream agent,
D, acts in its own best interests to choose its action, d. (8) The firm observes its objective, fr, and
(9) pays D its reward, w(s,if).
Naturally, we assume that the firm will announce a reward system only if it can do better with
the actions and profits implied by the reward system than it could do in the absence of a reward
system. (Without a reward system, the agents set u and d to zero.)
Firm's Goals, Agents' Goals
We assume that the firm is risk neutral and profit maximizing. Thus, the firm will seek to
maximize the expected value of profits minus wages:
(1) expected net profit = E(i(u,d) - v(s) - w(s,it)]
We assume that both the upstream and downstream agents are risk averse and will act in their own
best interests to maximize expected utility where the utilities, U and Ud, are integrable, thrice
differentiable, increasing, and concave. We scale perceived costs so that they are measured on the
same scale as profits and wages. (Please note: our mnemonic notation for the upstream agent, U,
is distinguished from the notation for utility, U, by the use of italics.) In the absence of a side
payment each agent acts to maximize the following expressions.
(2) Iupstream agent maximizes EU,[v(s) - c,(u)]
downstream agent maximizes EUdw(s,i) - cd(d)]
The upstream agent acts first by choosing an action, u, that the downstream agent can observe. In
the absence of a side payment, the downstream agent will take u as given and act to maximize the
second expression in Equation 2. The downstream agent's maximization implies three continuously
differentiable functions, s(u), d(u), and ir(u), which tell us how D would react to U's choice of
actions and how expected profit would be affected if there were no side payment.
However, we want to analyze situations that allow U to offer a side payment, g, to D in return
for a higher evaluation, s. We model this offer as a take it or leave it offer, but we could obtain
similar results for other assumptions on how U and D share surplus, if any, from the (g,s) contract.
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D will accept this contract if D can do at least as well by reporting s in return for receiving g. Thus,
D's expected utility from the contract must be at least as large as that which D can obtain in the
absence of a side payment. This constraint defines critical values of g(u,s) for every action, u, and
potential evaluation, s. We write d = d(u,s) for the action that D chooses in order to maximize its
own expected utility based on U's actions and the potential evaluation. We define 7r = ir(u,s) for the
resulting profits. Formally, the implied constraint is:
(3) EUd[w(,it) -c(da) +g(u,')] EUd[w(,it) -cd()]
For a given v and w, the upstream agent will select u and s to maximize its expected utility
recognizing that the choice of u and s implies d and g by Equation 3. (U will select g so that the
inequality in Equation 3 is binding.) Thus, if gainsharing is allowed, we modify the first line of
Equation 2 to obtain:
(4) EU,§ u] =EU,[v(s) - cu(u) - g(u)]
The firm will want to select the functions v and w to maximize Equation 1 recognizing that v and w
will cause U and D to choose ii, d, s, and r to maximize Equation 4 subject to Equation 3.
However, the firm must assure that neither U nor D refuse to take their actions. Let Uu and
Ld be the minimum utilities that U and D require to take non-zero actions. We assume that these
utilities represent the expected utility that U and D can obtain from other options that they have
available. That is, we assume that Ju and Ud are set by the market. Thus, the firm recognizes that
it must select v and w such that:
EU,[v(s - c(u -g(as'] U.
EUd[w(,)t)-cd(d +g(us)] Ud
Because the firm is maximizing expected profits, it will select v and w such that the constraints
implied by Equation 5 are binding.
Thus, in principle, for any choice of v and w, we can optimize Equation 1, subject to the
constraints imposed by Equations 3, 4, and 5. This optimization implies , d, and r as well as the
intermediate variables s, s, , ir, and g. Our technical assumptions assure that these solutions exist.
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Gainsharing Almost Always Occurs
The upstream/downstream structure of our formalization almost always guarantees
gainsharing. By this we mean that there are economic incentives for gainsharing. We do not model
situations where there is an exogenous fixed cost to gainsharing such as the potential of a reprimand
(or worse) for any perceived impropriety. Naturally, such fixed costs could mitigate the economic
incentives.
Interior Solutions
The intuition is best seen in the case where v and w imply interior solutions. In this case, in
the absence of a side payment, D will maximize the right hand side of equation 3 by setting the
derivatives to zero. That is,
(6) EUjw(,*) - cd(i] 
Thus, the marginal loss to D of an very small increase in s is zero. On the other hand, because U,
is increasing in v and v is increasing in s, U gains by having D increase s. That is,
(7) aEU[v(s - c(u)] > 0
Thus, intuitively there appear to be gains to trade at s -- U gains more than D loses.
The actual proof is more complex because we have to account for the integration implied by
the expected utility operators, but the basic intuition does not change. (A formal proof is given in
an appendix that is available from the authors. [attached for review]) For any v and w chosen by the
firm such that (1) the firm makes positive profits, (2) U and D find it better to take some actions than
to take no actions, and (3) the v and w imply interior solutions, then there are economic incentives
to gainshare.
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Constraints
For some v and w, U will find that the optimal solution to Equation 3 (RHS) or Equation 4
is a boundary solution. For example, suppose that s is constrained to be less than some upper bound,
s, and this upper bound is less than that which D would otherwise choose. Then D might find it to
be in its best interest to set s=s. This might replace the equality in equation 6 with an inequality and
there may be no gains to trade.
These are realistic situations. Grades may be limited to A+ or customer satisfaction ratings
may be limited to the top box of a 7-point scale. In these situations there may be no gainsharing
because U can choose u such that D reports s=s without a gainshare. For example, some travelers
might choose American Airlines even if there were no frequent flyer credits.
However, constraints do not rule out gainsharing. Some realistic v and w imply conditions
such that, in the absence of a gainshare, the best response by U and D is no action. In these
situations, the firm might get non-zero actions and profits only if gainsharing is allowed. For
example, with a specific v and w the traveler may only hit the road if he or she gets frequent flyer
credits. Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt (1996) demonstrate a system in which the linearity of v
and w cause U to provide D with a gainshare in return for reporting s=s.
No Room to Trade
There is a final situation we must consider. Suppose v increases at a slower rate than w
decreases. If this happens over the entire range, there will never be any s where there are gains to
trade. However, such a situation will not occur for a rational firm. If v increases at a slower rate
than w decreases, then the optimal response for D is to set s=O. However, this means that U will
set u=O because any actions incur costs without rewards. This will, in turn, cause D to set d=O and
the firm will earn only as much with the reward system in place as it did without the reward system
in place. This violates one of our assumptions.
This covers all the cases for continuous v and w. In an appendix we prove formally that:
RESULT 1. For incentive systems in which the rewards to the upstream agent are increasing in the
downstream agent's evaluation, the upstream agent will provide a positive side payment to the
downstream agent unless the firm sets a binding upper bound on the evaluation (or otherwise
precludes side payments). Even with a binding upper bound, there may be gainsharing.
PAGE 11
GAINSHARING ISSUES IN MARKETING
Gainsharing Need Not Hurt the Firm's Profits
Consider the following hypothetical situation. UD industries owns its own fleet of corporate
jets and these jets are used by the executive salesforce to sell big-ticket capital equipment around the
world. Let's assume that we can treat the corporate-jet division (U) as one agent and the salesforce
division (D) as another agent. (There will be free-riding issues within each division, but we will
ignore these for the purposes of this illustration.) In some general way (but with concave functions)
the corporate-jet division gets greater rewards if the salesforce uses its jets for transportation. The
salesforce division is rewarded for making profitable sales () but is charged for its use of the
corporate jets. If s signals the amount of corporate-jet travel that the salesforce division chooses, then
we can see that w is downward sloping in s and v is increasing in s. Finally, let's assume that the
executive salespeople value personal (non-business) travel by corporate jet -- at least as much as it
costs U to provide this service.
Suppose now that the corporate-jet division announces that it will provide frequent flyer credits
to the salesforce division and that the salesforce division can use these credits for their own personal
use. This is a public announcement and the firm is aware of the details of the frequent flyer program.
This may be efficient from the firm's standpoint because it can increase D's utility at least as much
with frequent flyer credits as it can with monetary rewards. If the firm can anticipate the value of
the frequent flyer credit (g) that D will receive, it can decrease D's rewards by g and still satisfy the
constraint in the second line of Equation 5. However, it must somehow compensate U for providing
the frequent flyer credit so that the first line of Equation 5 is not violated.
There are at least two ways for the firm to increase U's compensation. First, it might simply
increase U's fixed rewards by g. Alternatively, it might modify v so that, in equilibrium, U's choice
of actions implies a v(s) that reimburses U for the frequent flyer credit. Because U's actions and
effort in providing the frequent flyer credit are difficult for the firm to observe, this reward-for-rating
system might be more efficient. To keep profits the same, the firm might use w to decrease D's
rewards to offset the benefit of the frequent flyer program to D.
This example demonstrates the basic intuition of this section. If the firm can anticipate the
actions of U and D, it can use v to increase U's compensation by an amount equal to g and use w to
lower D's compensation by an amount equal to g. If it can do this in such a way that the U and D
choose the same actions, ui and d, under the new reward system with gainsharing as U and D chose
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under the old reward system without gainsharing, and if the new reward system does not impose any
new risks on U and D, then the firm can earn the same profits. (The firm earns 7r(i,d) before paying
wages, the same as without gainsharing. If the only change in w is to subtract a function of s, then
the firm does not have to reimburse for new risks -- the only change in the wages is that the firm
pays U more and D less by the amount g.) In the appendix (available from the authors) we prove:
RESULT 2. If the firm can preclude gainsharing and design a reward system, v and w, such that the
upstream and downstream agents, acting in their own best interests, choose actions u° and d, then,
without any loss of profits, the firm can design a reward system such that the upstream and
downstream agents, still acting in their own best interests, choose u° and d' even though they are free
to share gains.
The basic proof follows the intuition of the frequent flyer example. The modified reward system
changes the slope of v with respect to s to achieve the new equilibrium s implied by gainsharing. The
change in slope offsets the cost to U of g. The firm reduces D's rewards by V(s °) - v(s). This causes
D to prefer the new s while maintaining equality in Equation 5. Together these changes do not affect
the first-order conditions for ui and d nor do they add any risk. (Recall that s and g are anticipated
and do not depend upon the noise, e.)
Result 2 does not guarantee that a reward system can be found to maximize firm profits (with
or without risk). However, Result 2 does guarantee that if such a no-gainshare system can be found,
then the firm can also maximize profits with a gainsharing system. That is, gainsharing systems do
at least as well as non-gainsharing systems.
There might be situations where a gainsharing system is attractive to the firm. For example,
frequent flyer credits may help airlines smooth demand by encouraging flyers (1) to travel when
flights are not at capacity and (2) to upgrade to first-class seats that would otherwise be empty. It
may be less costly to the firm to allow its "road warriors" to be compensated in this way than it
would be to increase their monetary pay. This is, of course, an empirical question.5 (TWA estimates
the average cost of a frequent flyer trip award to be $28, considerably less than the traveler would
pay for a comparable flight. The current US tax code does not tax this benefit [Peterson 1996]).
5The Wall Street Journal (9/29/1995) states "One of the most widely bestowed favors by U.S. companies is the
foreign trip (to Chinese decision makers)."
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Gainsharing systems might also be attractive because they coordinate U and D and, especially,
make U's rewards sensitive to D's costs. To see this notice that U maximizes Equation 4 which is
linked directly to D's costs in Equation 3 because g(u,s) appears in both equations. This link is less
direct in Equation 2.
Summary
Gainsharing is common. Our formal analysis suggests that this should not be surprising
because (1) the structure of many upstream-downstream incentive systems often guarantees that there
are economic incentives to gainshare and (2) if the firm can anticipate this gainsharing then it can
always factor it into the compensation system with no loss of profits. Gainsharing may not occur if
s is constrained (Result 1) or if the firm or society uses peer pressure, cultural norms, or punishment
to prevent gainsharing.
Our analyses are limited to situations where gainsharing is public knowledge. There are many
research opportunities for studying other types of side payments in marketing. If the (g,s) contract
is not enforceable, then the system may break down or there might be additional risk-related costs
imposed on the system. For example, if a Lithuanian student's family can not be sure that the
professor will be around next semester, then they may take the uncertainty in s into account. Future
research might model this uncertainty or the implications of any information asymmetries that degrade
the ability to anticipate g. Other research might investigate whether situations exist such that the firm
can do better by allowing gainsharing than it can by precluding gainsharing. (For example, the firm
may be able to implement some actions, u and d, with a gainsharing system that it could not
implement with a no-gainshare system. Finally, there are a wealth of empirical research opportunities
to study the v and w functions that occur in practice. With sufficient empirical experience we might
improve both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of the theory.
1111_-·-_1 __1_-._ --------
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Appendix: Formal Proofs
REsULT 1. For incentive systems in which the rewards to the upstream agent are increasing in the
downstream agent's evaluation, the upstream agent will provide a positive gainshare to the downstream
agent unless thefirm sets a binding upper bound on the evaluation (or otherwise precludes side payments).
Even with a binding upper bound, there may be gainsharing.
Proof. Consider a given u. Letf(e) be the density function for e. Consider first the case where there is
no upper bound on s or it is not binding. U will seek to maximize the expression in Equation 4 subject to
the conditions imposed by D's maximization problems in Equation 3. Let r.=v-c.-g. Differentiating
Equation 4 we obtain:
cU a[v(')-c(u)-g(u e)de = 
L ,,ar fs' e)de = 0
By assumption, a u/ar>. The error, e, appears in w, but it does not appear in v, c, or g. Thus, this
integral can be zero if and only if aUjv-c.-gJ/as=O. Thus, this first order condition holds if only if:
(Al) a- g(u,s) = 0
af if
Let rd=w-Cd+g. We now use implicit differentiation on Equation 3 recognizing that the right-hand side
(RHS) does not depend on s.
(A2) f aUd[ ad aW(&,i) °  adg(u,') e)de =O
aw ag d =
By assumption aUd/ard, which depends on e, is positive. Furthermore, g(u,s) does not depend upon s,
and ard/aw=ard/ag=l. Hence, Equation A2 becomes:
(A3) Nd &Q) ag(usA)3,(A3)r f 8 d 'w(&"- flde)de = _ -ag(se)de
dar dl
From Al we have ag(s,u)/as =av(s)/as. But av(s)/as > 0 by assumption. Thus, the RHS of A3 is negative:
(A4) af. d N <0
By similar arguments we use implicit differentiation on Equation 3 to obtain.
(A5) (3Ud &Q,,A (A5) f-r '~)~ad .Ae)de = 0
Finally, we differentiate the left-hand side (LHS) of A4 or A5 to demonstrate that the second derivative
with respect to s is negative (concave) because a Ud/ar d> 0 and a2w/as: < O0. Thus, we have shown that the
first derivative of a concave function is negative at s and zero at s. Hence, > s. The gainshare is positive
by Equation 3. In the case where s is constrained, we add a Lagrange multiplier, -X(s-s,,), to U's
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optimization problem. This might allow a solution of the form av/as = X and ag/as = 0. If u were limited
to a finite set, we obtain a result similar to that for Lagrange multipliers by using a series of piecewise
functions for w such that each piece corresponds to a different action by U. Finally, the reader can verify
gainsharing for v=vo++v, and w=w+w,(1-s)+wsi for sE[O, 1] and sufficiently large v, and w,.u
RESULT 2. If the firm can preclude gainsharing and design a reward system, v and w, such that the
upstream and downstream agents, acting in their own best interests, choose actions u° and d°, then, without
any loss of profits, the firm can design a reward system such that the upstream and downstream agents,
still acting in their own best interests, choose u° and d" even though they are free to share gains..
Proof. We prove the theorem for any implementable actions, u" and d". We begin with interior solutions
for s. Let v°(s) and w'(s,i) implement u° and d° without gainsharing. (r, cd are shorthand for lr(u°,d)
and cd(d), respectively. Define rd° = w°(s,7)-cd(d) and ro = vO(s)-c(uO).) Then s° , u°, and d° satisfy the
following first order conditions.
aEU Ol $+
aEU ad w [8r ' (So s,) le)de = 0
aav, _ af r d o s°W
aEUd=f [d aW(s°,in) fr (u 3d 0)+ ard acd (d )j) 0
ad wd vtaWv 0 CO dacd ad
aEU 1 au, a a, v 0(s") _ a c(u¶) =0A= d c,(u o)] _ Ae)de = O
au J v ,, oV ay au ac au
At this point we could continue to track through all the integral expectations as we did in the proof to
Result 1. However, this notational nightmare adds no new insight to the basic proof. (Our proof
demonstrates that two sets of first-order conditions lead to the same u° and d. With the integrals, these
first-order conditions are still equal. We also refer the reader to Wernerfelt, Simester, and Hauser 1996
who provide a proof with the integrals, but for the special case when D is a pure supervisor and takes no
actions, d, to affect outcomes, r.) Thus we work with the terms in the brackets and leave it to the
interested reader to maintain the integrals throughout. This would be exact if the error, e, were additive
to w rather than to xr. Since ard/aw=-ardacdarPav=- arJac=l, the simplified first-order conditions
reduce to:
aw °(s 0
(A6) &0
aw°(s, i°) a(u,d °) acd(d )
(A7) ad ad
(A8) av(s0) as c.(u °)
as u - au
Now allow gainsharing and select new reward functions, w(s,r) = w"(s,7r) -as+V~(s°) and v(s) = cs.
Recall that the firm must reimburse U and D for their risk costs because i contains noise and both U and
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D are risk averse. Under the specified reward system (for no gainsharing) only D incurs risk due to
w°(s,ir). Because the noise does not affect s, the only risk that D will incur under the new reward system
is still due to w'(s,). Thus, if the new reward system implements v°, d", s, then the cost of risk will be
the same for D and hence for the firm which must reimburse D for that risk. Now, we must only prove
that an ca can be chosen such that the new reward functions implement u°, d, and s° when gainsharing is
allowed.
For a given u, without a gainshare, D would maximize the RHS of Equation 3. After
simplification similar to that used to derive Equations A6-A8, d(u°) and s(u°) are defined by the following.
(i is shorthand for 7r(u,d).)
(A9) = 0
(A O) , 0dft c ad ad
For a given u°, with a gainshare contract (g, ), D will choose d to maximize the LHS of Equation
3. After simplifying we obtain (i is shorthand for r(,d).)
(All) wO(s,*) aX(QU) _ a d() = 
a3-N adad
If ui = u° and s = s° , then Equation A11 is the same as Equation A7 implying d = d.
Now U chooses , , and g to maximize Equation 4 subject to Equation 3. Use the definition of
rd and r, from the proof to Result 1. We first differentiate Equation 4 and simplify (review Al).
(A12) a - ag =0
(A13) _ ac() _g = 0
au au
We use implicit differentiation on Equation 3. (U will choose g such that Equation 3 is binding. The
RHS is not a function of .) After simplification (review A2-A3):
(A14) w°(s,') _ o~ + ag = 0
Substituting Equation A12 into Equation A14 yields Equation A4 thus if =u° , then s=sO because d=do
whenever u=u° and s=s". We must now show that we can choose a such that ui=u°.
We begin by implicitly differentiating Equation 3 with respect to u. After extensive simplification
this becomes Equation A15. (We use the first-order conditions in Equations A7, A9, and A14 to eliminate
many terms by the envelop theorem and we use Equation A13 to substitute ag/au = -c,,()/au.)
We must now demonstrate that we can choose an ac such Equation A15 holds when the participation
constraints hold. (We first replace v°(s0) with K(Y) such that the participation constraints hold.) Let us
fix i=u" and =sO, then only the RHS of equation A15 varies as a varies. First consider =O. When
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(A1S) edd w(s) 82(U) ) e - 8c1 8Ude)de = 8Ud aw6s,) e Ae)de
Oa=O, UI=U, and &=s', then s=s" and d=d' by Equations A9 and A10 which become the same as A6 and
A7. Because the participation constraints hold, rd=rd, thus the term on the RHS of equation A15 is the
same as the first term on the LHS of Equation A15. Since auFard>o and ac/au>O, this implies that
for Equation A15 we have LHS < RHS.
Continue to fix i=u" and s=s and let a--oo. We use the implicit function theorem on Equations
A9 and A10 (differentiating with respect to a) to obtain:
(A16) +8i2Q d aze22 ft +12 O21 11
2 a a a ad i ad2 ad2 J j1
By the assumptions of the text, the term in the large brackets, {}, is negative, thus a&/aa < 0. Because the
second partials are bounded from zero, this implies that Sj--oo as a-*oo. Then, because a[awP/alr]/as is
bounded from zero, we have a8P(,/A)/a- - oo.. Hence, for a-oo in Equation A15 we have LHS > RHS.
Finally, Equations A9 and A10 tell us that the change with respect to ea is continuous, thus there must be
an oa between 0 and oo such that for Equation A15 LHS = RHS for i=u ° .
To summarize, we have proven that an a> 0 exists such that Equation A15 is satisfied. Thus, ui,
d, and s must satisfy Equations A6-A8 hence =u", d=d°, =s" for w(s,7r) = W(s,r) - es + V(s°), and
gainsharing is allowed. The proof for constrained s requires that we introduce Lagrange multipliers in
Equations A6, A8, A9, A12, and A14. This does not affect the arguments for =s" and d=d. We then
use the new A9 and A14 to simplify for Equation A15 and the rest of the proof follows. ·
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